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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the determination of pricing strategies for a firm that in each
period of a finite horizon receives replenishment quantities of a single product which it sells in two
markets, e.g., a long-distance market and an on-site market. The key difference between the two
markets is that the long-distance market provides for a one period delay in demand fulfillment.
In contrast, on-site orders must be filled immediately as the customer is at the physical on-site
location. We model the demands in consecutive periods as independent random variables and
their distributions depend on the item’s price in accordance with two general stochastic demand
functions: additive or multiplicative. The firm uses a single pool of inventory to fulfill demands
from both markets. We investigate properties of the structure of the dynamic pricing strategy
that maximizes the total expected discounted profit over the finite time horizon, under fixed
or controlled replenishment conditions. Further, we provide conditions under which one market
may be the preferred outlet to sale over the other.
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the problem of a firm that in each period of a finite horizon t = 1, . . . , T ,
receives replenishment quantities of a single product that it sells through two markets: i) an on-
site market (e.g., physical stores) and ii) a long-distance market (e.g., an online site). The firm
aims to maximize its total expected discounted revenue over a finite sales horizon of T periods by
adjusting the selling prices pi,t at the on-site market (i = s) and the long-distance market (i = `) in
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each period t. Both markets’ price dependent demands are satisfied using inventory that is held at
the on-site market location. When inventory is available, the on-site market’s demand is satisfied
immediately while the long-distance market’s demand is satisfied after a one period delay. In this
way, our scenario mimics one where physical channel customers are fulfilled while in the store and
the firm’s online/long-distance customers are fulfilled after a given delay (i.e. we assume they are
willing to wait one period before product is shipped). From the firm’s perspective, online orders
become a deterministic component of the next period’s demand and hence, prices can be set for the
following period while taking advantage of this information. Inventory in our model is exogenously
determined and we consider it to be a predetermined supply schedule as is often the case with
fashion items. For tractability, we assume excess demands from both markets are fully backlogged
at a specified per unit per period penalty cost. For long-distance customers, a reasonable shipping
delay of one period is considered palatable.
Examples of dual market strategies using a common pool of inventory are becoming more prevalent.
Large retailers like Nordstrom and Macy’s are expanding the role of their stores beyond their
traditional role and they are now using a combination of technology and customer service known as
omnichannel fulfillment to avoid stockout-driven lost sales from within their stores. In addition to
being a shopping destination for local customers, these retailers are transforming stores into online
order fulfillment centers and are using store inventory to satisfy an additional market of online
shoppers. Firms employing this type of dual market strategy have found dramatic improvements
in inventory turns and reduced markdowns because of the enlarged customer base through which
store inventory can be sold [15, 59]. In addition, there is currently a trend for U.S. retailers to use
their online sales channel and U.S. based inventory to reach customers overseas, e.g., in China [10].
Partnerships with Alipay, a payment processor closely linked to Alibaba Group Holdings, enable
U.S. retailers to overcome both economic and regulatory hurdles to enable this type of transactions.
In addition, Chinese consumers often prefer the reliability and brand authenticity offered by buying
directly from U.S. stores, cf. [58]. The reverse shipping direction is also becoming more common
with an inventory pool in China being used to reach Chinese customers living abroad or overseas
[62].
As serving dual markets has become easier for firms to achieve, smaller firms are also able to pursue
dual market strategies. One such firm, J&R Music, expanded into online sales after the events of
September 11, 2001 led to decreased foot traffic at their New York City store [19]. The ability
to reach new customers allowed them to offset the reduction in local customers. Gary’s Wine and
Marketplace, a local New Jersey wine retailer, attributes their winning of Beverage Dynamic’s 2012
Retailer of the Year to their new online presence [46]. The wine seller now has “10% of the business”
coming from its online store that is operated out of the back of its flagship Wayne, NJ retail outlet.
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In terms of pricing in dual markets, pricing policies within firms can be either constant across
markets or vary by market [72, 41]. In fashion retail, using pricing differences to intensify demand
in online and/or physical markets is commonplace.
To provide decision support and insight for this trend towards a single pool of inventory being used
to satisfy demand from two markets (channels), we investigate the dynamic pricing policies of a
retailer using store-level inventory to serve both its physical in-store customers and an additional
market of long distance customers to whom product is shipped. This retailer will use their pricing
policies in each market to intensify or reduce expected demand to better match its current and
anticipated inventory positions. Since each market’s demand pulls inventory from a common pool,
a key distinction between serving these two markets is how inventory can be deployed to fulfill
demand without penalty. For customers using the physical channel, demand is preferably satisfied
instantaneously while customers in the online channel are more willing to wait for product to be
shipped and delivered. As such, the optimal pricing policies developed in this paper regulate each
market’s demand intensity to balance the benefits of delivery postponement offered by on-line sales
against advantages, such as larger margins or smaller demand variability, that are available through
the physical channel.
For example, Ann Taylor, the upscale women’s apparel retailer, often employs such market-specific
promotional strategies. In one promotion it may seek to increase online (long-distance market)
demand (e.g. Figure 1(a)), with another it seeks to increase in-store (on-site market) demand (e.g.
Figure 1(b)), and at other times the firm seeks to increase demand in both markets (e.g. Figure 1(c)).
(a) Online Only Promo (b) Store Only Promo (c) Dual Channel Promo
Figure 1: Retailer Ann Taylor is often seen using promotions to increase demand through its online
channel, its physical channel, or both [? ].
The paper has the following structure. In Section 2 we review related literature. Our study of
dynamic pricing extends the existing single market literature to a dual market environment. In
Section 3 we define the notation and state the main assumptions that we will use throughout the
paper. In Section 4 we investigate the basic properties of model specified in §3. In Section 4, through
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exploration of both additive and multiplicative cases of demand variability, we find that a different
type of demand variability leads to different pricing policies being optimal. In §4.2, it is shown
that the optimal prices for both markets decrease in the inventory level when the on-site market
demand noise is additive. However, this property does not hold in the case at which both markets’
demand noise is multiplicative. For the multiplicative case, in §4.3, we show that the firm’s market
preference under an optimal policy can be specified by a threshold policy. Special cases for each
market’s demand being correlated and for the price in each market being equal are also explored
in this section. In Section 5 insights into the managerial implications of the optimal policies are
explored and discussed. For example, it is pointed out that at lower inventory levels a firm can
prefer sales through the long-distance market even in cases where the marginal profit of the on-site
market is significantly higher. We conclude this section with a brief discussion of issues related to
adopting alternative or relaxed assumptions to those made in this paper.
2 Literature Review
This paper’s main contribution is the construction of optimal dynamic pricing policies in a dual
market environment and the subsequent development of those policies’ managerial implications.
Our study of a second additional market extends the vast literature of dynamic pricing studies that
have been done in single market environments [see surveys in 13, 31, 60] to provide decision support
for this relatively new capability of companies to profitably employ long-distance sales markets; the
combination of the internet’s global reach with efficiencies in both domestic and international
shipping has ushered in the idea of profitably serving local and long-distance markets from the
same pool of inventory.
The single market studies most related to our research are finite time horizon models where a firm
uses dynamic pricing to intensify or reduce stochastic demand in response to current and future
supply availability. Authors Gallego and van Ryzin [38] called this intensity control and modeled
this using a Poisson arrival process with a price-dependent arrival rate. A related earlier study
considered a model for joint pricing and ordering with an exogenously determined stocking policy
[27], [61]. Our model is a dual market extension to the fully backlogged, periodic review, single
market model analyzed by Federgruen and Heching where it is demonstrated how to characterize
and compute simultaneous pricing and inventory policies [32]. The work of Chen and Simchi-
Levi [24] extends [32] to model an additional fixed cost component to ordering costs as well as
more general demand processes. Other extensions include assumptions to accommodate substitute
products [30], incorporation of lost sales as opposed to backlogging [57], and the analysis of demand
learning with finite capacity [5].
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Chen in [21] provides a model of a firm that may segment its market to gain advanced demand
information, as follows. The customer population is assumed to consist of M segments or types,
characterized by different reservation prices Poisson arrival processes with different rates. Arriving
customers are presented with a price schedule that specifies decreasing prices a customer will pay
if he/she agrees to different, increasing, shipping delays. Under sufficient assumptions it is shown
how to assign customers to the different market segments so as to maximize the firm’s long-run
average profits. In addition in [21] given an optimal price schedule, the author develops a optimal
replenishment policy, for a a firm that operates with an N -stage supply chain; where Stage 1 (the
point from which the product is shipped to customers) is replenished by Stage 2, which is replenished
by Stage 3, etc., and Stage N by an outside supplier with ample stock. It is shown that for any price
schedule, the optimal replenishment policy (that minimizes long-run average systemwide holding
and backorder costs) is to follow an echelon base-stock policy with order-up-to a level that is a
function of stage and time. Heuristic computational methods are also provided.
Our study herein focuses on a different problem for a firm in which there is a finite horizon selling
season, and prices are dynamically adjusted every period as a function of the “current” inventory
level and the number of periods remaining in the season. Other significant differences between the
two studies include the demand models we use and the exogenously determined replenishments in
our model.
In extending the dynamic pricing literature to dual markets, we adopt assumptions that have been
used in previous single market dynamic pricing studies. These assumptions include the modeling of
demand, leadtimes, stockouts, and review policies. Our first notable assumption is that demand is a
non-stationary linear function of price which includes either an additive or multiplicative stochastic
term; the same form that is used in [2, 24]. For the additive type of demand uncertainty,[24] prove
the optimality of (s,S) policies, but also show that those results do not hold for more general demand
functions (i.e. multiplicative plus additive). In most similar studies, optimal prices are shown to be
decreasing in inventory level [see for example 25, 26, 45, 52].
Given the complexity of our model, we adopt the simplifying assumption of a one-period delay (lead
time) for the fulfillment of the long-distance market demand. The use of a one period lead time
has a long history of being used to facilitate tractability [e.g. 43, 9, 37, 65, 67, 29]. More recently,
the assumption has been used in [6] to develop a mechanism of cost evaluation and optimization
for a deterministic replenishment lead-time model (also see this paper for a detailed review of
continuous-review inventory models), in [68] to analyze the effect of cancellation contracts on buyer
ordering and supplier production policies, and in [66] to study a multi-period inventory model in
which a supplier provides two alternative lead-time choices to customers, either a short or a long
lead time.
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Lastly, in regards to our modeling assumptions, we contribute to a long history of studying fully
backlogged periodic review inventory systems to yield tractable insights [see 7, 8, 32, 12, 11, for ex-
amples]. Other relevant studies employing this assumption include analyzing pricing and inventory
decisions when the supply chain includes multiple retail locations [33], Markovian demand [70], and
stochastic leadtimes [51].
Many notable models in the literature leverage different assumptions regarding the interplay of
demand, price, and inventory and we include some similar works here. These include assumptions of
inventory-dependent demand [56, 28] as well as the modeling of perishable inventory where examples
include [14] (in the context of a retail chain with coordination among its stores), [35, 74, 50, 47]
(whose authors develop a model that incorporates a simple risk measure that can be used to
control the probability that revenues are below a minimum acceptable level). Dynamic pricing
policies specific to applications in airline seat pricing are also an important application area and
readers are encouraged to see [71] and [63] as examples in this space.
Our research is also related to the dual-market research that is widely studied in the information
systems (IS) and marketing literature. This work has mainly focused on the benefits of online sales
and how the additional sales channel leads to higher valuations for a firm [see e.g. 18, 17, 20]. The
key drivers for the higher performance are noted to be better information access and lower setup
costs. Other notable work considers the inter-market competition and demand dependencies that
may exist when serving two markets [see 36, 16, 42].
The contribution of this paper is important as it provides managerial insight while tackling a level of
complexity that has been considered difficult in previous efforts. Specifically, complexity due to the
interplay between a retailer’s online and physical channels leads to difficulty crafting optimal dual
channel strategies, see review by [1]. In addition, finding the optimal strategy when more than one
type of multiplicative uncertainty is considered creates additional complexity [e.g. 4, 23] because
a firm cannot always optimally increase price in response to decreasing inventory. Despite this
complexity, we can provide structural insights into the optimal pricing policies in two markets and
also, provide managerial insights as to the drivers of preferring demand in one market over another.
There are several papers, tangential to our own, that have investigated different aspects of this
complexity. Similar to our model, [22] model endogenously determined demand in a dual channel
environment, but as opposed to manipulating price and/or inventory decisions to intensify demand
as we do, the authors restrict attention to policies choosing optimal service levels (as measured by
product availability in the physical channel and delivery lead time through the online channel).
Similar studies of endogenously determined response times fall under the category of time-based
competition [see for example 48, 69]. For other related work we refer to [39], [44], [53], [54] and
references therein.
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3 The Basic Model
Let T denote the finite number of periods in the selling horizon and let pi,t denote the posted selling
price at market i = s, ` in period t = 1, . . . , T.
We will use the following price mean demand model. First, we assume that there exists a function
d that represents the relation between the selling price pi,t and the mean amount of demand so
that di,t = d(pi,t) for each period t and market i. Thus, deciding the selling price pi,t is equivalent
to deciding the mean amount of demand di,t = d(pi,t) and conversely setting the mean demand of
market i at period t to d is equivalent deciding a price: pi,t(d) = d
−1
i,t (d). Further, it is assumed that
pi,t ∈ [p, p] where p and p are known finite lower and upper bounds for the price of market i = s, `
respectively. Thus, d = d(p) and d = d(p) are respectively upper and lower bounds for di,t.
The special cases: d(p) = b − cp (for b > 0, c > 0, d = 0, d = b) and d(p) = bp−c (for b > 0,
c > 1,d = 0, d = b−δ, δ ∈ (0, b)) are well known examples of mean demand models in the literature
and the reader is referred to both [52] and [24] for further discussion. Throughout the paper, we
often simplify the demand model notation by dropping the explicit functional relationship between
demand and price and simply write d for d(p).
The expected revenue Ri,t(di,t) = di,tpi,t(di,t) is assumed to be a strictly increasing concave function
and twice-differentiable in d. The implication of this assumption is that the retail firm’s revenue
increases as the mean demand increases, but does so with diminishing returns to increasing demand,
a similar assumption can be found [24].
As in [24], we consider two types of demand stochasticity (i.e demand noise), additive and multi-
plicative. While the firm can choose mean demand by setting price accordingly, actual demand Di,t
is a stochastic function that can be expressed as:
Di,t = i,tdi,t + ωi,t, i = s, `. (1)
Here, i,t is a random variable representing multiplicative demand noise where E(i,t) = 1 and
i,t ∈ [i, i] ⊂ [0, i], for all i, t. The random variables ωi,t represent additive demand noise and it
is assumed that E(ωi,t) = 0, for all i, t. Using this expression for stochastic demand, products with
price sensitive customers will often exhibit demand realizations consistent with the multiplicative
uncertainty model whereas products with less price sensitive customers are best modeled using
additive demand uncertainty. To gain insights, we develop most of our results for the more tractable
case where each market’s demand is independent of the other. Subsequently, in §4.3.3 we relax this
assumption.
In each period, there are inventory holding and backorder costs, their sum we denote by H(x).
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For our analysis, we adopt the common assumption of a holding cost structure: H(x) = ch(x)
+ +
cp(−x)+ where (x)+ = max{0, x}. Generally, we call ch as the unit holding cost and cp as the unit
shortage cost. Unmet demand is fully backlogged.
We note that the backlogging assumption for items of the primary market s is an approximation, as
in reality (i.e., reasonable values of the pertinent costs) most of the time backlogging will be incurred
only for items demanded in the secondary market `. Generally, retailers will satisfy backlogged
demand prior to replenishing shelves. However, H() does not distinguish the priority with which
backlogged customers are satisfied i.e., failing to satisfy a new customer or a backlogged customer
incurs the same per period penalty. In addition even though, replenishment quantity decisions are
made exogenously, the holding cost is relevant to the retailer as it represents a measure of cost
due to some items being damaged through mishandling, losses due to theft or other record keeping
problems, as well as the standard opportunity costs.
The sequence of events at each period t = 1, . . . , T , can be written as follows. The inventory level,
It, is reviewed. ii) A quantity of product qt arrives and is made available in the current period,
where qt is exogenously determined. iii) The retailer sets the demand intensity level (through pricing
changes) by choosing the mean demands for the on-site market ds,t and the long-distance market
d`,t. iv) Demand for the on-site market, Ds,t, is realized, and satisfied immediately up to the extent
there is available supply. Unmet demand is fully backlogged. v) Demand for the long distance
market, D`,t is realized. The long-distance market demand, while known, is neither satisfied nor
backlogged in this step. vi) Holding costs and backorder costs that are a function H(·) of the on
site market ending inventory It + qt −Ds,t are incurred:
H(It + qt −Ds,t) = ch(It + qt −Ds,t)+ + cp(It + qt −Ds,t)−.
Note that inventory held to meet the long-distance demand D`,t incurs a holding cost charge in this
step, since it is not subtracted from the ending inventory in the term ch(It + qt −Ds,t)+; it is the
price the firm pays for delaying the fulfillment of D`,t (via shipments) by one period. vii) Demand
for the long distance market, D`,t is processed and satisfied to the extent inventory is available.
Unmet demand is fully backlogged and not distinguished from any on-site demand that has been
backlogged.
Let Ri,t(di) (i = s, `) denote the expected revenue at market i = s, `, in period t = 1, . . . , T . Since
unmet demand is backlogged, we have:
Ri,t(di) = di pit(di) = E[(i,tdi + ωi,t)pit(ds)], i = s, `.
The inventory level for period t+ 1 is calculated as follows:
It+1 = It + qt −Ds,t −D`,t. (2)
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Let Vt(I) be the optimal expected profit from period t to the end of horizon. The terminal condition
is
VT+1(I) = cemin{0, I} for all I.
The justification of the terminal condition is as follows. At the end of the horizon, i.e., when
t = T + 1, if there is a shortage, i.e., when I < 0, then shortage incurs is assumed to be supplied by
an external supplier at the firm’s expense, of ce per unit of shortage. If there is remaining inventory,
I ≥ 0, then any remaining inventory is assumed to have zero salvage value and VT+1 = 0.
Letting α ∈ (0, 1] be a discount factor, the dynamic programming equations can be written as
follows:
Vt(I) = max
ds,d`∈[d,d]
Jt(I, ds, d`), (3)
where
Jt(I, ds, d`) = Rs,t(ds) +R`,t(d`)−EH(I + qt − s,tds − ωs,t)
+αEVt+1(I + qt − s,tds − ωs,t − `,td` − ω`,t). (4)
The retailer starts each period with a given inventory position I = It and a predetermined shipment,
qt. The retailer’s objective is to control the demand intensities: (ds,t(I), d`,t(I)), through price
changes, to maximize expected profit over the planning horizon.
Let (d∗s,t(I), d∗`,t(I)) be the maximizer of Eq. (3). We will use the convenetion that if more than one
maximizers exist, the retailer chooses the solution with the smallest sum of each market’s mean
demand.
To avoid trivial cases, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 For i = s, `, the following are true
1. R′i,t(d) > max{cp, ch}.
2. ce > max{R′s,T (0), R′`,T (0)} − cp.
The first statement of Assumption 1 ensures the retailer has incentive to both carry inventory and
backlog demand as required by guaranteeing that the marginal revenue is bigger than both the
unit holding cost and the unit shortage cost. The second statement of Assumption 1 avoids trivial
cases where a retailer chooses to backlog demand towards the end of planning horizon because the
outside supplier’s cost is competitive with the firm’s internal manufacturing costs. Due to this high
cost of outsourcing supply in the last period, we assume the retailer will not sell products through
the long-distant market in the last period (d`,T = 0).
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4 Structure of Optimal Policies
In this section, we analyze the model specified in §3. In §4.1, we investigate the basic properties
of the value function and show how concavity guarantees the existence of an optimal solution to
the dual-market dynamic pricing model. In §4.2, we show that the optimal prices for both markets
decrease in the inventory level when the on-site market demand noise is additive. However, this
property does not hold in the case at which both markets’ demand noise is multiplicative. For the
multiplicative case, in §4.3, we show that the firm’s market preference under an optimal policy can
be specified by a threshold policy. A resulting insight is the identification of conditions under which
a firm prefers to sell products in the long-distance market. Special cases for each market’s demand
being correlated and for the price in each market being equal are also explored in this section.
4.1 Concavity and Supermodularity Properties
In the following two lemmas, we state structural results regarding the value function Vt(I) of Eq. (3)
and the profit function Jt(I, ds, d`) of Eq. (4). We will use these results in the subsequent analysis.
Lemma 1 establishes the concavity of Vt(I) as well as concavity and supermodularity properties
for Jt(I, ds, d`) and thus, it ensures the existence of an optimal solution.
Lemma 1 The following statements are true.
(i) Vt(I) > −∞.
(ii) Vt(I) is concave in I and Jt(I, ds, d`) is, component-wise, concave in each of the variables I,
ds. d`.
(iii) Jt(I, ds, d`) is submodular in (ds, d`) and supermodular in (I, ds) and in (I, d`).
The existence of a maximizer (d∗s,t(I), d∗`,t(I)) follows from the concavity of Jt(I, ds, d`). Further the
concavity of the profit function Jt(I, ds, d`), in I, indicates that the marginal profit decreases in the
inventory level.
Combining the concavity results of Lemma 1 and [64], we have Jt(I, ds, d`) is supermodular in
(I, ds) and (I, d`). That is to say, if one market’s mean demand di,t (i.e. price) is considered fixed,
then the optimal mean demand d∗j,t(I) in the other market (j 6= i) increases as the inventory I level
increases.
To find the optimal mean demand levels (d∗s,t(I), d∗`,t(I)), we note that the first order partial deriva-
tives can be written as follows:
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∂Jt
∂ds
= R′s,t(ds) + E
[
s,tH
′(I + qt − s,tds − ωs,t
]
−αE[s,tV ′t+1(I + qt − s,tds − ωs,t − `,td` − ω`,t)] (5)
∂Jt
∂d`
= R′`,t(d`)− αE
[
`,tV
′
t+1(I + qt − s,tds − ωs,t − `,td` − ω`,t)
]
(6)
From the concavity of Rs,t, R`,t, −H and Vt, we have both ∂Jt∂ds and ∂Jt∂d` decrease in ds and d`. Indeed,
note that H is differentiable almost every where. V is differentiable because demand uncertainty
is continuous. First order partial derivatives, as above, can be used because d∗s,t(I) and d∗`,t(I) are
both continuous in I. Given the concavity of Jt, the optimal solution, (d
∗
s,t, d
∗
`,t), is the solution to
the above first order partial derivatives equations. Furthermore, we can obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 2
@ δ > 0 : d∗s,t(I + δ) < d∗s,t(I) and d∗`,t(I + δ) < d∗`,t(I) (7)
Lemma 2 implies that at least one of d∗s,t(I) and d∗`,t(I) increases in I. Given more inventory on
hand, the firm will decrease the sales price in at least one of the two markets. In the following
section, we will establish the stronger result that both markets’ selling prices are decreasing in
inventory level for the case of additive demand noise.
4.2 Additive Demand Noise
In this section, we consider the case where at least one of the market’s demand distributions are
characterized by purely additive demand noise such that either ∀t ∈ T : s,t ≡ 1 or ∀t ∈ T : `,t ≡ 1.
For this case, price changes in the market(s) with additive demand noise result in changing the
mean of a market’s demand distribution, but not its variability. As discussed in [2], additive demand
noise is typical of well-established products where the effect of pricing changes on store traffic is
well understood. Uncertainty in these cases tends to be limited to forecasting error. In contrast
to what we will see in the next section when the demand uncertainty is multiplicative, a firm’s
market preference for selling in one market over another will be unchanged in an additive demand
uncertainty environment. The main results of this section, Theorem 1, show that in the additive
demand uncertainty environment, the firm prefers to sell more products through both markets
when the inventory level It or the incoming inventory qt increases.
Theorem 1 Under the assumptions made and if the demand noise for the on-site market is addi-
tive, i.e., s,t ≡ 1 for all t, then
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(i) d∗s,t(I) increases in I.
(ii) I − d∗s,t(I) increases in I.
(iii) d∗`,t(I) increases in I.
Remark 1 Following similar logic, we can establish the effect of the incoming inventory qt. If the
demand noise for the on-site market is additive, i.e., s,t ≡ 1 for all t, both d∗s,t(I) and d∗`,t(I)
increase in qt.
Remark 2 Following a similar argument as that of Theorem 1, we can also obtain that both d∗s,t(I)
and d∗l,t(I) are increasing in I if the demand uncertainty in the long-distance market is additive,
i.e., l,t ≡ 1 for all t.
Theorem 1(i) and (iii) states that inventory level increases are accompanied by decreases in the
optimal selling prices for both markets and the firm seeks to simultaneously increase demand in
both markets. We show in §4.3 that these results do not hold in the case of multiplicative demand
variability. Also under additive demand uncertainty, the desired amount of customers increases less
than one unit when inventory increases by one unit (see Theorem 1(ii)). Since the marginal revenue
of an additional unit of sales decreases as demand increases, the expected demand must increase
less than one unit when the inventory level is increased by one unit.
4.3 Multiplicative Demand Noise
In the multiplicative demand variability case (i.e., ωi,t = 0 for i = s, ` and for all t) demand
uncertainty increases with increasing demand and equivalently, it increases with decreasing price.
In this section, we will numerically demonstrate that this increased uncertainty leads to non-
monotone results. Because of this, characterizing the relationship between inventory and optimal
demand levels is more challenging. However, it is still possible to gain insight and in this section,
we leverage the existence of threshold policies to characterize: 1) conditions under which a retailer
makes product available for sale in each market (§4.3.1), Theorem 2) conditions under which one
market is considered preferable because product is made available for sale in that market, but
not the other (§4.3.2), Theorem 3) conditions under which one market is considered preferable
because its expected demand is higher than the other market which also offers the product for
sale (§4.3.2),Theorem 4) the effects of demand correlation on a firm’s market preference (§4.3.3),
and Theorem 5) the effects of restricting the price to be equal in both markets on a firm’s market
preference (§4.3.4).
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Before we present the analytical treatment of the multiplicative case, we use a numerical example to
illustrate the behavior of the optimal average demand (d∗s,t(I), d∗`,t(I)) as functions of the inventory
level. The parameters of this example are specified in Example 1 which is presented along with
Figure 2. Three important characteristics of the multiplicative demand noise case are established
with this example:
1. The relationship between inventory level and optimal mean demand (d∗s,t(I), d∗`,t) is non-
monotonic. For example, d∗`,1(−1.3) = 0.88 < 0.97 = d∗`,1(−1.4).
2. There appears to be a threshold inventory level for each market at which below that inventory
level, sales are not pursued in that market and above that level, sales are pursued. When a
market’s optimal demand level is zero, d∗i,t = 0, we say that market i is closed (i.e. Di,t(0) = 0).
3. As inventory levels increase, it is possible that the firm’s preference to sell in one market over
the other (as indicated by a higher expected demand level) may reverse.
Note that in the multiplicative case, an increase in the mean demand di,t in a particular market is
accompanied by an undesirable increase in demand variance σ2(Di,t) which makes the characteriza-
tion of pricing decisions difficult to address. Similar difficulties have been noted by [49] who study
an analogous environment with multiplicative yield uncertainty. In the multiplicative demand en-
vironment with two markets, increasing mean demand is not always the proper response to higher
levels of inventory. In some cases, decreasing demand in one market allows for inventory to build
(with the new deliveries) and can be used in subsequent periods.
Remark 3 Our insight for the non-monotonicity phenomenon that appears in the case with multi-
plicative noise, (when Di,t = i,tdi,t with E(i,t) = 1) is as follows. When the controller increases the
expected demand di,t she also increases its variance with d
2
i,t. Hence, it is possible that for certain
values of inventory increasing di,t implies cost contributions of a shortage that are low relatively to
the cost implications of the additional demand variability. This is phenomenon is further amplified
by the finite horizon of the selling season. Thus, as it was also noted in the context of a different
model in [34], it may be it optimal to target a lower, rather than a higher, expected inventory level
after ordering.
4.3.1 Threshold Policies for Market Preferences
The numerical study shows that optimal selling quantities in on-site market or long distance market
may increase or decrease as inventory level increases. This lack of monotonicity makes analytical
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Example 1 T = 2, H(I) = 2 max{I, 0} + 5 max{−I, 0}, Rs,t(d) = (10 − 0.5d)d, R`,t(d) = (9 −
0.5d)d (0 ≤ d ≤ 9) and VT+1(I) = 10 min{I, 0}. εs,t follows a truncated normal distribution with
E(εs,t) = 1, σ(εs,t) = 0.6 and εs,t ∈ (0, 2). ε`,t follows another truncated normal distribution with
E(ε`,t) = 1, σ(ε`,t) = 0.9 and ε`,t ∈ (0, 2). The discount factor α = 0.8. qT = 1 and qT−1 = 2. Figure
(2) below illustrates the non-monotonic relationship between the optimal mean demands d∗i,t(I) for
each market and the inventory level.
Figure 2: Plot of d∗s,t(I) and d∗`,t(I) versus I.
insights more difficult to achieve. Despite this, we characterize optimal pricing policies using the
following two simplified benchmark problems:
(B`) V
B`
t (I) = max
ds,d`
Jt(I, ds, d`), (8)
JB`t (I, ds, dl) = Rs,t(ds) +R`,t(d`)−EH(I + qt − s,tds)
+αEVt+1(I + qt − s,tds − d`). (9)
(Bs) V
Bs
t (I) = max
ds,d`
Jt(I, ds, d`), (10)
JBst (I, ds, dl) = Rs,t(ds) +R`,t(d`)−EH(I + qt − ds)
+αEVt+1(I + qt − ds − `,td`). (11)
Let (dB`∗s,t (I), d
B`∗
`,t (I)) denote the corresponding maximizer in Eq. (8) and (d
Bs∗
s,t (I), d
Bs∗
`,t (I)) denote
the corresponding maximizer in Eq. (10) . If there are multiple maximizers, the solution with
smallest (dk∗s,t(I), dk∗`,t(I))is chosen (k = B`, Bs).
Note that the above benchmark problems are no longer dynamic programs. They are one-period
representations of our original model (§3) that assume that Vt+1(·) is given and that the demand
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uncertainty in one of the markets has been eliminated. In the benchmark problem B`, the long-
distance market’s demand uncertainty in the current period is removed. Similarly, Bs removes the
on-site market’s demand uncertainty during the current period. For these two benchmark problems,
threshold policies prescribing the levels of inventory at which the firm makes product available for
sale in each market are established below in Lemmas 3 - 4. These threshold policies are then proven
identical to the threshold policies that exist for the original model. Theorem 2, which is proved
with Lemmas 3 - 4, establishes this existence and defines threshold inventory levels, I∗i,t, such that
d∗i,t(I) = 0 and d
∗
i,t(I) > 0 if and only if I > I
∗
i,t. We introduce the two benchmark models to yield
analytic results by making each market’s optimal demand intensity monotonic in the inventory
level. Formally connecting the analytic results of the benchmark problems to the original problem
is now shown through Lemmas 3 - 4 and Theorem 2.
Lemma 3 (i) For the benchmark problem (B`), we have d
B`∗
`,t (I) increases in I.
(ii) For the benchmark problem (Bs), we have d
Bs∗
s,t (I) increases in I.
Lemma 4 (i) d∗`,t(I) = 0 if and only if d
B`∗
`,t (I) = 0.
(ii) d∗s,t(I) = 0 if and only if d
Bs∗
s,t (I) = 0.
Theorem 2 If the demand noise for both markets is multiplicative, i.e., ωi,t = 0 for all i = s, `, t =
1, . . .,T, then the following are true.
i) There exist numbers I∗i,t , i = s, `, such that:
d∗i,t(I) =
{
> 0 if I > I∗i,t ,
= 0 if I ≤ I∗i,t .
(12)
ii) Further, I∗s,t satisfies:
V ′t (I
∗
s,t) = R
′
s,t(0) . (13)
Theorem 2 proves the existence of these threshold inventory levels, I∗i,t, such that d
∗
i,t(I) = 0 and
d∗i,t(I) > 0) if and only if I > I
∗
i,t. The theorem also provides a simple characterization of the
on-site market’s threshold level I∗s,t in terms of marginal changes of the value function, Vt(I), and
the revenue function, Rs,t(d).
Mathematically, choosing which products to sell through which combination of markets is a more
challenging problem [73]. Retailers sometimes choose to offer greater assortment through their
online channel while other retailers have products tailored to local needs that are not available
online. The existence of threshold policies shows that inventory considerations play an important
role in this decision. Further characterization of these policies is pursued in subsequent sections.
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4.3.2 Market Preference
For any time period t, we call the market with the higher demand intensity for a given inventory
level, i : arg maxi∈{s,`} d∗i,t(I), as the “the preferred market”. At lower inventory levels, the preferred
market can also be characterized as the market with the lower threshold inventory as the firm will
open only the preferred market and keep the mean demand of the other market at 0. To differentiate,
the market with the lower threshold inventory will be called the “preferred opening market”. As
seen in Example 1, market preference may be surprising. In that example, the firm prefers the
long-distance market at lower inventory levels even though the on-site market has greater expected
revenue (Rs,t(d) > R`,t(d), for all d) and lower demand variability (σ(ε`,t) > σ(εs,t)). Also from that
example, we observe that as the inventory level increases, this preference can change. For larger
values of I, market preference is reversed and the on-site market is preferred as more demand is
encouraged through that market, d∗s,1(I) > d∗`,1(I).
We now develop analytic insights into market preferences. From Theorem 2, we know that the
marginal profit of the available inventory equals the marginal revenue of opening the on-site market
R
′
s,t(0) at the on-site market threshold inventory level I
∗
s,t. Lemma 5 below provides an analogous,
albeit complex, expression for the long-distance market threshhold I∗`,t.
Lemma 5
V ′t (I
∗
`,t) = R
′
`,t(0)−EH ′(I∗`,t + qt − s,td∗s,t(I∗`,t)) (14)
The conditions under which one market is preferred to another when the inventory level is low can
now be stated:
Theorem 3 The following two statements are true.
i) If R′s,t(0) > R′`,t(0) + cp, then I
∗
s,t < I
∗
`,t.
ii) If R′`,t(0) > R
′
s,t(0) + ch, then I
∗
s,t > I
∗
`,t.
Managerially, Theorem 3 provides conditions for having a clearly preferred opening market. In
general, if one market’s opening has an associated marginal expected revenue that sufficiently
exceeds the other market’s opening marginal expected revenue, then that market becomes the
preferred market. The question is what does it mean to sufficiently exceed the other market’s
marginal revenue? For the on-site market to be clearly preferred, then the on-site’s marginal revenue
must exceed the long distance market’s revenue by one unit of shortage cost. For the long distance
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market to be clearly preferred, then the long distance market’s marginal revenue must exceed the
on-site market’s revenue by one unit of holding cost. In the next theorem, conditions where the
preference is less clear are explored:
Theorem 4 When (R′`,t(0)− αR′`,t+1(0))/α > cp, the following two statements are true.
i) If R′s,t(0) > R′`,t(0) + cp, then I
∗
s,t < I
∗
`,t.
ii) If R′s,t(0) < R′`,t(0) + cp, then I
∗
s,t > I
∗
`,t.
Theorem 4 is best interpreted by examining the effects of shortage costs on the opening market
preference. As in Theorem 3, when shortage costs are small and the on-site market provides greater
marginal revenue upon market opening, then the on-site market is preferred (Theorem 4(i)). This
preference continues until cp is large enough to meet the conditions of Theorem 4(ii). At this point,
the value of delayed fulfillment in the long distance market comes to bear. By fulfilling long-distance
orders in the subsequent period, pricing decisions in that subsequent period can be made with less
demand uncertainty. And hence, by selling through the long-distance market the firm has less
risk of incurring shortage costs than if the on-site market were opened. Notice that the firm still
prefers selling in the long-distance market when R′`,t(0) < R
′
s(0) < R
′
`,t(0) + cp. That is to say,
even though the marginal expected revenue of selling in the long-distance market is less than the
marginal expected revenue of selling in the on-site market, the firm still prefers selling in the long-
distance market. We again refer the reader to Example 1 where the “counter-intuitive” behavior
implied by Theorem 4(ii) is seen. In this example, the on-site market has higher marginal profit (i.e.
R`,t(d) < Rs,t(d)) and also lower variability in demand (i.e. σ(ε`,t) > σ(εs,t)), and seems preferable
in all the parameters of our model. Nevertheless, the threshold inventory level for opening the long-
distance market is still lower than that of the on-site market; the advanced demand information of
the long-distance market is still valuable.
We have seen that the market preference of the firm can change as the current inventory position
increases. We study this phenomenon in Theorem 5 for the case of identical demand distributions
and revenue functions in each market.
Theorem 5 If Rs,t(d) = R`,t(d) for all d, t and s,t, `,t follow the same distribution, and ds = d`,
then following statements are true.
i) d∗s,t(I) ≤ d∗`,t(I) when E[s,tH ′(I + qt − s,td∗s,t(I))] ≤ 0.
ii)) d∗s,t(I) ≥ d∗`,t(I) when E[s,tH ′(I + qt − s,td∗s,t(I))] ≥ 0
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Theorem 5 establishes the existence of a specific inventory level where if current inventory is below
that level the demand intensity in the on-site market is optimally set higher than the demand
intensity in the long-distance market. When current inventory exceeds that specified level, then
the long-distance market becomes the preferred sales channel. The key insight is that inventory
considerations have significant impact on the optimal selling strategy. In limited inventory situations
a retailer prefers selling through an online channel, whereas when inventory is plentiful the on-
site market will be the preferred sales channel. Due to the complexity of handling multiplicative
demands, additional theoretical results seem intractable. However, the importance of this theorem
is that it gives guidance to decision-making in a multi-market environment. The benefit of the
long-distance market dominates the retailer’s policy when the inventory level is low. While this
paper only analyzes a one period potential for delayed shipment, if a longer delay for the long-
distance market is possible, then the advantage of long-distance market is even greater (assuming
low inventory).
4.3.3 Correlated Demand
In the previous sections, we made the assumption that demand in each market was independent.
We now turn to the significantly more complex case of correlated demands in the two markets.
For example, one would expect that for certain short lifecycle products, like fashion or high-tech
products, demand in both markets will ebb and flow together with waning or rising consumer
sentiment. In the general case of correlated demands, optimal policies may not posses a structure
determined by thresholds and insight for this case is not easily achieved. However, we have obtained
the result of Proposition 1 below, that provides for a necessary condition for the on-site market to
be opened.
Proposition 1 When Ds,t and D`,t are correlated, the following is true:
If d∗s,t(I) > 0, then V
′
t (I) < R
′
s(0).
Next we will discuss the perfect correlation case. Such cases are commonly used in studies of
inventory systems with multiple random variables, e.g, [23]. For fixed t the demands Ds,t and D`,t
exhibit perfect positive (negative) correlation when the variables s,t and `,t are related with Eq.
(15), for a constant a > 0 (a < 0) .
s,t − 1 = a(`,t − 1). (15)
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In this case in Proposition 2 below, we provide provable conditions regarding the on-site mar-
ket’s threshold inventory level for the case of perfectly correlated demand (negatively or positively
correlated).
Proposition 2 When d∗s,t(I) = 0 and ∃δ > 0 satisfying that d∗s,t(I + ρ) > 0 for all 0 < ρ < δ, the
following are true:
• V ′t (I) ≤ R′s(0), if Ds,t and D`,t exhibit perfect positive correlation;
• V ′t (I) ≥ R′s(0), if Ds,t and D`,t exhibit perfect negative correlation.
Combining these two propositions, Theorem 6 below, helps us shed light on comparing the correlated
demand case and the independent demand case. Specifically, if Ds,t and D`,t exhibit perfect negative
correlation, then the firm exhibits similar characterizations of the threshold inventory level for the
on-site market.
Theorem 6 If Ds,t and D`,t perfect negative correlated, then there exists a I
∗
s,t satisfying that
V ′t (I∗s,t) = R′s(0) and
d∗s,t(I) =
{
> 0 I > I∗s,t
= 0 I ≤ I∗s,t
(16)
4.3.4 The Case in which Price is Constrained to be Equal in Both Markets
In this section, examine the case where the two markets must charge the same price in each period
as it is a policy many ‘clicks and mortar’ retailers adopt. In this case the demand functions are
specified by: d`,t = β`,t
(
1 − p
p
)
and ds,t = βs,t
(
1 − p
p
)
. For period t, the optimization is written as
follows:
V ut (I) = max
p∈[p,p]
Jut (I, p), (17)
where
Jut (I, p) = β`,tp
(
1− p
p
)
+ βs,tp
(
1− p
p
)−EH[I + qt − s,tβs,t(1− p
p
)
+αEVt+1[I + qt − s,tβs,t
(
1− p
p
)− `,tβ`,t(1− p
p
)
]. (18)
Let put (I) as the maximizer.
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Lemma 6 put (I) decreases in I.
Lemma 6 proves the intuitive result that a retailer will decrease price in response to inventory level
increases. Denote Iut ∗ := max{I|put (I) = p}. When the inventory level is lower than Iut ∗, the retailer
will stop sales in both markets and hence, a threshold policy can be established. Furthermore, we
prove the following:
Theorem 7 min{I∗s,t, I∗`,t} ≤ Iut ∗ ≤ max{I∗s,t, I∗`,t}
Theorem 7 places bounds on the threshold policy when a single price is used in both markets.
Interestingly, the retailer will open both markets at an inventory level in between the threshold
inventory levels of the two markets in the previous price setting. For example, sales will commence
at an inventory level where the retailer in a heterogeneous price setting opens only one market.
Likewise, inventory levels where a retailer with greater pricing flexibility would close both markets
will also represent an inventory level where the price constrained firm has closed both markets.
When a firm does have the ability to price differently in each market, the results of Theorem 7 can
be used to decrease the dimensionality of the retailer’s pricing decision. Insights, such as knowledge
of Iut ∗, can provide a starting point for considering the market opening decision. Given Iut ∗ and
current inventory levels, the firm knows whether opening sales at both markets at the same price
is optimal and hence, can use this information as a basis for considering which market should be
opened earlier if able to charge different prices in the two markets.
Remark 4 a) We note that when the holding cost approaches zero, the difference between a post-
poned delivery and immediately shipping disappears. However, the analysis remains meaningful. We
note that following interesting special cases.
Case 1. cp = ch = 0 and pst(d) = p`t(d) (i.e., Rst(d)) = R`t(d)), then I
∗
st(d) = I
∗
`t in Theorems 2
and 3 .
Case 2. cp = 0, ch > 0 and pst(d) = p`t(d) (i.e., Rst(d)) = R`t(d)), then R
′
s,t(0) = R
′
`,t(0), and if
one goes through the steps of the proof of Theorem 3 one can show that I∗st ≤ I∗`t. Furthermore, in
this case if we assume the conditions of Theorem 5 hold, i.e., s,t, `,t follow the same distribution,
then E[s,tH
′(I + qt − s,td∗s,t(I)) = ch > 0 and we have d∗s,t(I) ≥ d∗`,t(I).
Case 3. cp > 0, ch = 0 and pst(d) = p`t(d) (i.e., Rst(d)) = R`t(d)), then R
′
s,t(0) = R
′
`,t(0), and if
one goes through the steps of the proof of Theorem 3 one can show that I∗st ≥ I∗`t. In addition, in
this case if we assume the conditions of Theorem 5 hold, i.e., s,t, `,t follow the same distribution,
then E[s,tH
′(I + qt − s,td∗s,t(I)) = −cp < 0 and we have d∗s,t(I) ≤ d∗`,t(I).
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b) Backlogging is adopted as a reasonable simplifying assumption. We note that for the primary
market s in our model (as in reality) most of the time backlogging will be incurred only for items
demanded in the secondary market `. To see this consider the following realizations (examples),
where we take T = 2 and I1 = 6, q1 = 5, q2 = 0; recall that It+1 = It + qt −Ds,t −D`,t.
Example 1: Ds,1 = 3 D`,1 = 2, I2 = 1 + 5, Ds,2 = 2 D`,1 = 2. Then I3 = 2, i.e., no backlogged
units at the end T + 1 = 3.
Example 2: Ds,1 = 5 D`,1 = 3, I2 = −2 + 5 = 3, Ds,2 = 2 D`,1 = 2. Then 2 units of the ` market
are backlogged at the end of the 1st period and I3 = −1, i.e., 1 unit of the ` market is backlogged at
the end T + 1 = 3.
Example 3 (extreme and rare case): Ds,1 = 30, D`,1 = 2, I2 = −26 + 5 = −21, Ds,2 = 2 D`,1 = 2.
Then 26 units (24 of the s and 2 of the ` market) are backlogged at the end of the 1st period and
I3 = −20, i.e., 19 units (from period 1) are backlogged all the way to the end (T + 1 = 3) and
1 unit from period 2. Our computations confirm that for reasonable choices of the relevant costs,
realizations described in Example 3 do not occur. However, allowing them does simplify the analysis
of this challenging problem.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the structure of a retailer’s optimal selling strategies when the retailer
is faced with two distinct sales markets and a common pool of replenishable inventory with which
to satisfy demand. A summary of the core selling strategies derived in §4 is provided in Table 1. The
optimal policies in this table indicate that both inventory and demand uncertainty are key issues
in choosing which markets to open up for demand, i.e., choose a price for which the mean market
demand is positive. Based on the type of demand uncertainty, it is shown that optimal policies are
characterized by inventory level thresholds which determine whether which market will offer the
product for sale and at what price.
The following managerial insight is provided. When demand uncertainty in both markets is addi-
tive and inventory is low, selling exclusively through the online market is preferred. As inventory
increases beyond a specific threshold, the online market is also opened (offers the item for sale),
and the optimal selling strategy is to increase demand intensity in both markets as I increases
further. However, the problem is more challenging when both markets have multiplicative demand
uncertainty. In this case it is shown that the sales in one channel may actually decrease as the
inventory level increases. Despite this, we show that the demand intensity in at least one of the
markets does indeed increase as the inventory level increases. A key result is provided by the fol-
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lowing property we establish in the multiplicative mean demand model case. In this case it is shown
that optimal threshold policies can derived from benchmark problems where demand uncertainty
in the current period can be ignored. Hence, if a retailer would sell through a particular market
assuming no uncertainty in demand in the current period, then they should also open that market
when multiplicative uncertainty exists.
Table 1: Optimal Selling Strategies under Different Demand Uncertainty Models
Type of Demand Certainty
on-site market long-distance market Optimal selling strategy
There exist an inventory level I¯t and a pair of mean demands (d¯s,t, d¯`,t).
additive additive If I ≥ I¯t, then d∗s,t(I), I¯t − d∗s,t(I) and d∗`,t(I) increasing in I∗.
If I ≤ I¯t, then d∗s,t(I) = 0 and d∗`,t(I) increases as I increases.
There exist an inventory level I¯t and a pair of the mean demands (d¯s,t, d¯`,t).
additive multiplicative If I ≥ I¯t, then d∗`,t(I), I¯t − d∗`,t(I) and d∗s,t(I) increasing in I∗(I).
If I ≤ I¯t, then d∗`,t(I) = 0 and d∗s,t(I) increases as I increases.
Optimal selling policy is a threshold policy.
multiplicative additive Optimal selling quantities at both on-site market and long-distance market increase as the inventory level increases.
Optimal selling policy is a threshold policy.
multiplicative multiplicative Optimal selling quantity at on-site market or long-distance market may increase or decrease as the inventory level increases.
Optimal selling quantity at at least one of on-site market and long-distance market increases as inventory level increases.
For a retailer serving two markets from a common pool of inventory, the insights from this paper
can be valuable. With limited inventory, the retailer will prefer to sell through only one market. In
this limited inventory scenario, analyzing cases where the marginal profit in each market is equal
reveals an often overlooked benefit of selling through the online channel; namely, gaining demand
information is a truly valuable aspect of serving this market. Evidence of this was shown through
characterization of cases where a firm prefers sales through the long-distance market despite the
marginal profit of the on-site market being significantly larger.
In conclusion, this study contributes to the literature by providing the first model for a firm’s dual
market dynamic pricing problem in the presence of exogenously determined inventory replenishment
considerations. Our study of a finite horizon case is consistent with fashion products, whereas the
infinite horizon case might provide tractable insight for functional products.
In current and future work, we plan to investigate the effect of relaxing some of our modeling
assumptions. For instance, a retailer may choose not to handle online demand in a batch at the end of
the period and exploration of flexibility in the long-distance market’s timing of demand satisfaction
(e.g. satisfy in this period or the subsequent one) would provide meaningful results. Extensions
treating the lost sales case and providing more thorough treatment of the correlation of the two
market’s demands are also the subject of future research. Herein, we have provided conditions
regarding the on-site market’s threshold inventory level for the case of perfectly (negatively or
positively) correlated demands. In the general case, if the two markets demands are correlated,
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then the threshold structure of an optimal policy may not hold.
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A Appendix: Proofs
In this section we will use the following simplified definition of supermodularity (i.e., “increasing
differences”) of a real function on IR2 given in Definition A.1 below. A comprehensive exposition of
the topic of supermodularity and its application in sequential decision problems is given in [64].
Definition A.1 A real function f(x, y) is supermodular in (x, y) ∈ IR2 if
f(x1, y1) + f(x2, y2) ≥ f(x1, y2) + f(x2, y1)
for all x1 ≥ x2 and y1 ≥ y2.
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If the inequality above is reversed, the function f is called submodular.
Lemma A.1 below summarizes properties of supermodular functions that we will use, we refer the
reader to [64] (Theorem 2.6.2) and [55] for proofs.
Lemma A.1 (Topkis 1998)
1. If g(x) IR→ IR is concave, then
f(x, y) = g(x+ y)
is submodular in (x, y) and
h(x, y) = g(x− y)
is supermodular in (x, y).
2. If f(x, y) is supermodular (submodular) in (x, y) ∈ IR2 and
x˜∗f (y) = argmaxxf(x, y)
then x˜∗f (y) is increasing (decreasing) in y.
Proof of Lemma 1. We first clarify the existence of optimality. The existence of the optimality
follows from the continuity of the value function and boundary condition of d ∈ [d, d]. Denote
cH = max{cp, ch}. First, we have VT+1(I) = ceI+ > 0. Also, EVT+1(IT + qT − Ds,T − D`,T ) =
ceE(IT + qT −Ds,T −D`,T )+ ≥ ce(IT + qT − (ds,T + d`,T )) > −∞. The proof is easy to complete
using induction and Eq. (3).
Second, we will show that Vt is concave in I. From the terminal condition that VT+1(I) = ce min{I, 0}
for all I, it is clear VT+1 is concave. If we assume Vt is concave, then because the linear combina-
tion of two concave functions is concave, we have that Jt(I, ds, d`) is concave in (I, ds, d`). Given
that concavity is preserved under maximization [40], we obtain that Vt−1 is concave. The second
statement of Lemma 1 also follows by induction. The last statement follows from the concavity of
V , −H, Rs and R` and Lemma A.1. 
Proof of Lemma 2. We only need to show that if δ > 0 and d∗s,t(I + δ) < d∗s,t(I) then
d∗`,t(I + δ) ≥ d∗`,t(I). We can write d∗`,t(I) = arg max
d`≤d`≤d`
Jt(I, d
∗
s,t(I), d`) as
= arg max
d`≤d`≤d`
Rs(d
∗
s,t(I)) +R`,t(d`)−EH(I + qt− s,td∗s,t(I)) +αEVt+1(I + qt− s,td∗s,t(I)− `,td`).
Because −H and Vt+1 are concave, Jt(I, d∗s,t(I), d`) is supermodular in (I, d`) and submodular in
(d∗s,t(I), d`). Now, from Lemma A.1, we have d∗` (I) increases in I and decreases in d
∗
s,t. Hence, from
I + δ > I and d∗s,t(I + δ) < d∗s,t(I), we can obtain d∗`,t(I + δ) ≥ d∗`,t(I). 
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Proof of Theorem 1. To see part i), from (3) and (4), we first have that
Vt(I) = max
ds≤ds≤ds
[
Rs,t(ds)−EH(I + qt − ds − ωs,t) + f(I − ds)
]
(19)
where f(x) = max
d`≤d`≤d`
[
R`,t(d`) + αEVt+1(x+ qt − ωs,t − `,td` − ω`,t)
]
(20)
Because Vt is concave and concavity is preserved under maximization, f is concave. We can show
that the right side of Eq. (19) is supermodular in (I, ds). The first term depends only on ds and
it is clearly submodular in (I, ds). The supermodularity of the second and the third terms follows
from the concavity of −H, f and linear combination of I − ds Therefore, from from Lemman A.1
we have d∗s,t(I) increases in I.
To see part ii), we denote x = I − ds and x∗(I) = I − d∗s,t(I). From (3), we have
Vt(I) = max
I+ds≤x≤I+ds
[
Rs,t(x− I)−EH(x+ qt − ωs,t) + f(x)
]
(21)
Following a similar argument as in the proof of part i), we can show that x∗(I) increases in I.
To establish part iii), we note that the right side of Eq. (20) is supermodular in (x, d`). The first
term depends only on d` and it is clearly supermodular in (x, d`). The supermodularity of the
second term follows from the concavity of Vt and linear combination of x − `,td`. Therefore, we
have d∗`,t(I) is increasing in x
∗(I). Combining this with the result of part ii), we have that d∗`,t(I)
increases in I. 
Proof of Remark 1. At time t consider two forthcoming order quantities qat , q
b
t with q
a
t > q
b
t
and let V j , J jt and (d
∗,j
s,t (I), d
∗,j
`,t (I)) denote the optimal profit, objective function and optimal
selling price corresponding to the forthcoming order quantities qjt , j = a, b. From Eq. (4) it follows
that Jat (I, ds, d`) = J
b
t (I + q
a
t − qbt , ds, d`) for all ds and d`. Now using Lemma 1, we obtain:
d∗,ai,t (I) = d
∗,b
i,t (I + q
a
t − qbt ) ≥ d∗,bi,t (I) for i = s, `. 
Proof of Lemma 3. To prove part i), we use the first order partial derivatives. From the
supermodularity of JB`∗t in (I, d`), we have d
B`∗
` (I) increases in I if ds ∈ {0, ds}. For the case in
which ds ∈ (0, ds), we will show that dd
B`∗
` (I)
dI ≥ 0. Because ds > 0 and s,t is a random variable
with a continuous distribution, I + qt − s,tds 6= 0 almost everywhere, we only need to focus on the
interval where H ′ and H ′′ exist and we note that H ′′(I + qt − s,tds) = 0 almost everywhere.
From the first order partial derivatives, we have that when ds = d
B`∗
s,t (I) and d` = d
B`∗
` (I),
0 = R′s,t(ds) + E
[
s,tH
′(I + qt − s,tds)
]− αE[s,tV ′t+1(I + qt − s,tds − d`)]
0 = R′`,t(d`)− αE
[
V ′t+1(I + qt − s,tds − d`)
]
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and with H ′′(I + qt − s,tds) = 0 almost everywhere, we have
0 = R′′s,t(d
B`∗
s,t (I))
ddB`∗s,t (I)
dI
− αE[s,t(1− s,tddB`∗s,t (I)
dI
− dd
B`∗
` (I)
dI
)V ′′t+1(I + qt − s,tdB`∗s,t (I)− dB`∗` (I))
]
(22)
0 = R′′`,t(d
B`∗
` (I))
ddB`∗` (I)
dI
− αE[(1− s,tddB`∗s,t (I)
dI
− dd
B`∗
` (I)
dI
)V ′′t+1(I + qt − s,tdB`∗s,t (I)− dB`∗` (I))
]
(23)
To simplify the notation, denote
d′s(I) =
dd
B`∗
s,t (I)
dI , d
′
`(I) =
dd
B`∗
` (I)
dI ,
γs = −R′′s,t(dB`∗s,t (I)), γ` = −R′′`,t(dB`∗` (I)),
$s,t = −V ′′t+1(I + qt − s,tdB`∗s,t (I)− dB`∗` (I)) ∀s,t.
From the strict concavity of Rs,t and R`,t and the concavity of −H and V , we have
γs > 0, γ` > 0, $s,t ≥ 0. (24)
We can rewrite (22) and (23) as follows.[
γs + αE(
2
s,t$s,t)
]
d′s(I) + αE(s,t$s,t)d
′
`(I) = αE(s,t$s,t)
αE(s,t$s,t)d
′
s(I) +
[
γ` + αE($s,t)
]
d′`(I) = αE($s,t)
From above two equations, we have
d′`(I) =
αE($s,t)
[
γs + αE(
2
s,t$s,t)
]− αE(s,t$s,t)αE(s,t$s,t)[
γ` + αE($s,t)
][
γs + αE(2s,t$s,t)
]− α2E(s,t$s,t)2 (25)
From the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
E($s,t)E(
2
s,t$s,t)−E2(s,t$s,t) = E(√$s,t)2E(s,t√$s,t)2 −E2[(s,t√$s,t)√$s,t ] ≥ 0. (26)
Combining this result with Ineqs. (24), we have:
αE($s,t)
[
γs + αE(
2
s,t$s,t)
]− αE(s,t$s,t)αE(s,t$s,t)
≥ α2[E($s,t)E(2s,t$s,t)−E2(s,t$s,t)] ≥ 0,
and [
γ` + αE($s,t)
][
γs + αE(
2
s,t$s,t)
]− α2E(s,t$s,t)2 > α2[E($s,t)E(2s,t$s,t) ≥ 0.
The above together with Eq. (25), imply that d′`(I) ≥ 0. That is to say,
dd
B`∗
` (I)
dI ≥ 0.
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To see Part (ii), we rewrite objective function as follows
V Bst (I) = max
ds
Rs,t(ds) +G(I − ds)
where
G(x) = max
d`
R`,t(d`)−EH(x+ qt) + αEVt+1(x+ qt − `,td`).
First, we have G(x) is concave in x. Hence, G(I − ds) is supermodular in (I, ds). Further,
Rs,t(ds) +G(I − ds) is supermodular in (I, ds). Therefore, dBs∗s (I) is increasing in I. 
Proof of Lemma 4. First, we show that if dB`∗`,t (I) = 0 then d
∗
`,t(I) = 0. For all ds, d`, we have
JB`t (I, ds, d`)−Jt(I, ds, d`)=αEVt+1(I + qt−s,tds −d`)−αEVt+1(I + qt−s,tds −s,td`) ≥ 0. (27)
The inequality follows from the concavity of Vt+1 and Jensen’s inequality.
If dB`∗`,t (I) = 0, we can obtain that
Jt(I, d
B`∗
s,t (I), 0) = J
B`
t (I, d
B`∗
s,t (I), 0) ≥ JB`t (I, ds, d`) ≥ Jt(I, ds, d`) ∀ds, d`. (28)
The first inequality follows from the optimality of (dB`∗s,t (I), 0). The second inequality follows from
Ineq. (27). Notice that we always pick up the the maximizer with the smallest d∗` . Therefore, we
have d∗`,t(I) = 0 from (28).
Below, we will show that if d∗`,t(I) = 0, then d
B`∗
`,t (I) = 0 and prove the statement by contradiction.
Suppose d∗`,t(I
a) = 0 and dB`∗`,t (I
a) > 0. From d∗`,t(I) = 0, we can find I
b ≥ Ia and a positive number
δ > 0 satisfying the conditions that d∗`t(I
b) = 0 and d∗`t(I
b +ρ) > 0 for all 0 < ρ < δ. We still notice
that
∂Jt
∂ds
|d`=0 = R′s,t(ds) + E[s,tH ′(I + qt − s,tds)]− αE[s,tV ′t+1(I + qt − s,tds)]
=
∂JB`t
∂ds
|d`=0 (29)
∂Jt
∂d`
|d`=0 = R′`,t(0)− αE[`,tV ′t+1(I + qt − s,tds)] = R′`,t(0)− αE[V ′t+1(I + qt − s,tds)]
=
∂JB`t
∂d`
|d`=0 (30)
Hence, we have
∂JB`t (I
b, ds, d`)
∂d`
∣∣
(ds,d`)=(d∗s(Ib),0)
=
∂Jt(I
b, ds, d`)
∂d`
∣∣
(ds,d`)=(d∗s(Ib),0)
= 0 (31)
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If d∗s,t(Ib) = 0, then combining with (29) we have
∂JB`t (I
b, ds, d`)
∂ds
∣∣
(ds,d`)=(0,0)
=
∂Jt(I
b, ds, d`)
∂ds
∣∣
(ds,d`)=(0,0)
≤ 0.
Together with Eq. (31), we have dB`∗`,t (I
b) = 0 and dB`∗s,t (Ib) = 0.
If d∗s,t(Ib) = ds, then combining with Eq. (29) we will have
∂JB`t (I
b, ds, d`)
∂ds
∣∣
(ds,d`)=(ds,0)
=
∂Jt(I
b, ds, d`)
∂ds
∣∣
(ds,d`)=(ds,0)
≥ 0.
Together with Eq. (31), we have dB`∗`,t (I
b) = 0 and dB`∗s,t (Ib) = ds.
If d∗s,t(Ib) ∈ (0, ds), then combining with (29) we have
∂JB`t (I
b, ds, d`)
∂ds
∣∣
ds=d∗s,t(Ib),d`=0
=
∂Jt(I
b, ds, d`)
∂ds
∣∣
ds=d∗s,t(Ib),d`=0
= 0.
Together with Eq. (31), we have dB`∗`,t (I
b) = 0 and dB`∗s,t (Ib) = d∗s,t(Ib).
In the above three cases, we can get dB`∗`,t (I
b) = 0. However, from Lemma 3, we have dB`∗`,t (I
b) ≥
dB`∗`,t (I
a) > 0 and thus, have a contradiction. Therefore, we reach dB`∗`,t (I) = 0 if and only if d
∗
`,t(I) =
0.
To see part (ii), we can get that dBs∗s,t (I) = 0 if and only if d∗s,t(I) = 0 by similar argument as the
part (i). 
Proof of Theorem 2. From Lemmas 3 and 4, there exist I∗`,t satisfying that d
B`∗
`,t (I) > 0,
d∗`,t(I) > 0 if I > I
∗
`,t and d
∗
`,t(I) = d
B`∗
`,t (I) = 0 if I ≤ I∗`,t. Follow the same logic, we have there
exist I∗s,t satisfying that d
Bs∗
s,t (I) > 0, d
∗
s,t(I) > 0 if I > I
∗
s,t and d
∗
s,t(I) = d
Bs∗
s,t (I) = 0 if I ≤ I∗s,t.
From the envelop theorem and (5), we also have that when I = I∗s,t,
V ′(I) = H ′(I + qt) + αE
[
V ′t+1(I + qt − `,td∗` (I))
]
0 =
∂Jt
∂ds
= R′s,t(0)−H ′(I + qt)− αE
[
V ′t+1(I + qt − `,td∗` (I))
]
Hence, V ′t (I∗s,t) = R′s,t(0). 
Proof of Lemma 5. From d∗`,t(I
∗
`,t) = 0, we have
V ′t (I
∗
`,t) = −E
[
H ′(I∗`,t + qt − s,td∗s,t(I∗`,t))
]
+ αE
[
V ′t+1(I
∗
`,t + qt − `,td∗`,t(I∗`,t))
]
. (32)
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From the first order partial derivatives and Theorem 2, we also have
0 =
∂Jt(I, ds, d`)
∂d`
|d`=0
= R′`(0)− αE
[
`,tV
′
t+1(I
∗
`,t + qt − s,td∗s,t(I∗`,t)− `,td∗`,t(I∗`,t))
]
= R′`(0)− αEV ′t+1(I∗`,t + qt − s,td∗s,t(I∗`,t)). (33)
Combining Eqs. (32) and (33), we have V ′t (I∗`,t) = R
′
`(0)−E
[
H ′(I∗`,t + qt − s,td∗s,t(I∗`,t))
]
. 
Proof of Theorem 3. If R′s,t(0) > R′`,t(0) + cp, then using Theorem 2 and Lemma 5 we have
that V ′t (I∗s,t) = R′s,t(0) > R′`,t(0) + cp ≥ R′`,t(0)−E
[
H ′(I∗`,t + qt − s,td∗s,t(I∗`,t))
]
= V ′t (I∗`,t). Since Vt
is concave, I∗s,t < I∗`,t.
If R′`,t(0) > R
′
s,t(0) + h, then using Theorem 2 and Lemma 5 we obtain V
′
t (I
∗
s,t) = R
′
s,t(0) <
R′`,t(0) − ch ≤ R′`,t(0) − E
[
H ′(I∗`,t + qt − s,td∗s,t(I∗`,t))
]
= V ′t (I∗`,t). Because Vt is concave, we have
I∗s,t > I∗`,t. 
Proof of Theorem 4. The first statement follows directly from Theorem 3 and thus, we focus
on proving the second statement. Instead of proving the second statement directly, we will use
mathematic induction to prove that if R′s,t(0) < R′`,t(0) + cp, then for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1,
I∗`,t < I
∗
s,t and V
′
t (0) ≤ R′`,t(0) + cp. (34)
First, we will show that relations (34) are true at t = T − 1.
For all I ≤ −qT and ds ≥ 0, we have
JT (I, ds, 0) = Rs,T (ds)−EH(I + qT − s,tds) + E[emin{I + qT − s,tds, 0}]
≤ Rs,T (0) + (ce + cp)ds + cp(I + qT − ds) + ce(I + qT − ds)
= Rs,T (0) + cp(I + qT ) + ce(I + qT )
= JT (I, 0, 0)
The inequality follows from ce > R
′
s,T (0)− cp ≥ R′s,T (ds)− cp. Hence, d∗s,T (I) = 0 for all I ≤ −qT .
For every I > −qT , we have that ∂JT∂ds |ds=0 = R′s,T (0)− ch > 0. Hence d∗s,T (I) > 0 for all I > −qT .
Therefore I∗s,T = −qT and V ′T (0) ≤ V ′T (−qT ) = R′s,T (0) < R′`,T (0) + cp.
Combining the above with the condition,
R′`,T−1(0)−αR′`,T (0)
α > cp, we have
R′`,T−1(0)−αR′`,T (0)
α > cp >
V ′T (0)−R′`,T (0), i.e., αV ′T (0) < R′`,T−1(0). Hence, we can find a δ2 > 0 satisfying the following:
α
VT (0)− VT (−sδ2)
sδ2
<
R`,T−1(δ2)−R`,T−1(0)
δ2
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From the concavity of VT , we have that for any realization s,t > 0
α
VT (0)− VT (−s,tδ2)
s,tδ2
≤ αVT (0)− VT (−sδ2)
sδ2
<
R`,T−1(δ2)−R`,T−1(0)
δ2
α
VT (0)− VT (−s,tδ2)
R`,T−1(δ2)−R`,T−1(0) <
s,tδ2
δ2
If s,T−1 = 0, then α
VT (0)−VT (−s,T−1δ2)
R`,T−1(δ2)−R`,T−1(0) =
s,T−1δ2
δ2
. Taking the expectations of both sides of the
above inequality, we have
α
VT (0)−EVT (−s,T−1δ2)
R`,T−1(δ2)−R`,T−1(0) <
E(s,T−1δ2)
δ2
= 1.
R`,T−1(0) + αVT (0) < R`,T−1(δ2) + αEVT (−s,T−1δ2) (35)
Therefore,
JT−1(−qT−1, 0, 0) = R`,T−1(0) +Rs,T−1(0)−EH(0) + αEVT (0)
< R`,T−1(δ2) +Rs,T−1(0)−EH(0) + αEVT (−s,T−1δ2)
= JT−1(−qT−1, 0, δ2).
The inequality follows from Ineq. (35).
Hence, d∗s,T−1(−qT−1) + d∗`,T−1(−qT−1) > 0. It is to say , min{I∗`,t, I∗s,t}+ qT−1 < 0.
Next we will show that I∗`,T−1 < I
∗
s,T−1 by contradiction. Suppose I
∗
`,T−1 ≥ I∗s,T−1, then d∗s,T−1(I∗s,T−1) =
d∗s,T−1(I
∗
s,T−1) = 0
∂JT−1
∂d`
∣∣
I=I∗s,T−1,ds=0,d`=0
= R′`,T−1(0)− αEV ′T (I) ≤ 0.
∂JT−1
∂ds
∣∣
I=I∗s,T−1,ds=0,d`=0
= R′s,T−1(0) + EH
′(I + qT−1) + αEV ′T (I + qT−1)
= R′s,T−1(0)− cp + αEV ′T (I + qT−1) = 0.
Hence, R′s,T−1(0)− cp ≥ R′`,T−1(0) which contradicts our assumption and therefore I∗`,T−1 < I∗s,T−1.
We still have that
V ′T−1(0) ≤ V ′T−1(I∗`,T−1) = R′`,T−1(0)−EH ′(I∗s,T−1 + qT−1) ≤ R′`,T−1(0) + cp.
The first inequality follows from I∗`,T−1 < −qT−1 ≤ 0 and the concavity of VT−1.
Assume V ′t+1(0) ≤ R′`,t+1(0) + cp. We will show that I∗`,t < I∗s,t and V ′t (0) ≤ R′`,t(0) + s. From
R′`,t(0)−αR′`,t+1(0)
α > cp, we will have αV
′
t+1(0) < R
′
`,t(0). Hence, we can find a δ3 > 0 satisfying the
inequality below
α
Vt+1(0)− Vt+1(−sδ3)
sδ3
<
R`,t(δ3)−R`,t(0)
δ3
.
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Note that for any realization with s,t = 0, we have:
α
Vt+1(0)− Vt+1(−s,tδ3)
R`,t(δ3)−R`,t(0) = 0 =
s,tδ3
δ3
(36)
In addition, for any realization s,t > 0 the following inequality holds.
α
Vt+1(0)− Vt+1(−s,tδ3)
R`,t(δ3)−R`,t(0) <
s,tδ3
δ3
. (37)
Inequality (37), is due to the the concavity of Vt+1, which implies:
α
Vt+1(0)− Vt+1(−s,tδ3)
s,tδ3
≤ αVt+1(0)− Vt+1(−sδ3)
sδ3
<
R`,t(δ3)−R`,t(0)
δ3
.
Taking expectations inequalities (36), (37) imply:
α
Vt+1(0)−EVt+1(−s,tδ3)
R`,t(δ3)−R`,t(0) <
E(s,tδ3)
δ3
= 1,
and
R`,t(0) + αVt+1(0) < R`,t(δ3) + αEVt+1(−s,tδ3). (38)
Therefore,
Jt(−qt, 0, 0) = R`,t(0) +Rs,t(0)−EH(0) + αEVt+1(0)
< R`,t(δ3) +Rs,t(0)−EH(0) + αEVt+1(−s,tδ3)
= Jt(−qt, 0, δ3).
The inequality follows from Ineq. (38).
Hence, d∗s,t(−qt) + d∗`,t(−qt) > 0, i.e.,
min{I∗`,t, I∗s,t}+ qt < 0.
We next show that I∗`,t < I
∗
s,t by contradiction. Suppose I
∗
`,t ≥ I∗s,t, Then d∗s,t(I∗s,t) = d∗s,t(I∗s,t) = 0
∂Jt
∂d`
∣∣
I=I∗s,t,ds=0,d`=0
= R′`,t(0)− αEV ′t+1(I) ≤ 0.
∂Jt
∂ds
∣∣
I=I∗s,t,ds=0,d`=0
= R′s,t(0) + EH
′(I + qt) + αEV ′t+1(I + qt)
= R′s,t(0)− cp + αEV ′t+1(I + qt) = 0.
Hence, R′s(0) − cp ≥ R′`(0) which contradicts our assumption. Hence, we have I∗`,t < I∗s,t. We still
have that
V ′t (0) ≤ V ′t (I∗`,t) = R′`,t(0)−EH ′(I∗s,t + qt) ≤ R′`,t(0) + cp.
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The first inequality follows from I∗`,t < −qt ≤ 0 and the concavity of Vt. Hence, we obtain (34). The
proof is now complete. 
Proof of Theorem 5. We need to consider the following three cases:
a) d∗s,t(I) ≤ d∗`,t(I) when E[s,tH ′(I + qt − s,td∗s,t(I))] < 0.
b) d∗s,t(I) ≥ d∗`,t(I) when E[s,tH ′(I + qt − s,td∗s,t(I))] > 0.
c) d∗s,t(I) = d∗`,t(I) when E[s,tH
′(I + qt − s,td∗s,t(I))] = 0.
a) We prove case a) by contradiction. Suppose d∗s,t(I) > d∗`,t(I). If E[s,tH
′(I + qt− s,td∗s,t(I))] < 0,
then we can find δ1 ∈ (0, d∗s,t(I)− d∗`,t(I)) satisfying that
E[H(I + qt − s,t(d∗s,t(I)− δ1))] < E[H(I + qt − s,td∗s,t(I))]. (39)
From the concavity of Rs,t and d
∗
`,t(I) + δ1 < d
∗
s,t(I), we have
Rs,t(d
∗
s,t(I))−Rs,t(d∗s,t(I)− δ1) < Rs,t(d∗`,t(I) + δ1)−Rs,t(d∗`,t(I)) = R`,t(d∗`,t(I) + δ1)−R`,t(d∗`,t(I)).
That is to say,
Rs,t(d
∗
s,t(I)) +R`,t(d
∗
`,t(I)) < Rs,t(d
∗
s,t(I)− δ1) +R`,t(d∗`,t(I) + δ1). (40)
Meanwhile, from the concavity of Vt+1 and δ1 < d
∗
s,t(I)− d∗`,t(I), we have
EVt+1(I + qt − s,td∗s,t(I)− `,td∗`,t(I))
= (1− δ1
d∗s,t(I)− d∗`,t(I)
)EVt+1(I + qt − s,td∗s,t(I)− `,td∗`,t(I))
+
δ1
d∗s,t(I)− d∗`,t(I)
EVt+1(I + qt − s,td∗`,t(I)− `,td∗s,t(I))
≤ EVt+1(I + qt − s,t(d∗s,t(I)− δ1)− `,t(d∗`,t(I) + δ1)) (41)
Together with Ineqs. (39) and (40), we have
Jt(I, d
∗
s,t(I)− δ1, d∗`,t(I) + δ1)
= Rs,t(d
∗
s,t(I)− δ1) +R`,t(d∗`,t(I) + δ1)−E[H(I + qt − s,t(d∗s,t(I)− δ1))]
+αEVt+1(I + qt − s,t(d∗s,t(I)− δ1)− `,t(d∗`,t(I) + δ1))
> Rs,t(d
∗
s,t(I)) +R`,t(d
∗
`,t(I))−E[H(I + qt − s,td∗s,t(I))]
+αEVt+1(I + qt − s,td∗s,t(I)− `,td∗`,t(I))
= Jt(I, d
∗
s,t(I), d
∗
`,t(I))
which contradicts with the optimality of (d∗s,t(I), d∗`,t(I)).
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b) The proof of case b) is also by contradiction. Suppose d∗s,t(I) < d∗`,t(I). If E[s,tH
′(I + qt −
s,td
∗
s,t(I))] > 0, then we can find δ2 ∈ (0, d∗`,t(I)− d∗s,t(I)) satisfying that
EH(I + qt − s,t(d∗s,t(I) + δ2)) < EH(I + qt − s,td∗s,t(I)) (42)
From the concavity of R` and d
∗
s,t(I) + δ2 < d
∗
`,t(I), we have
R`,t(d
∗
`,t(I))−R`,t(d∗`,t(I)− δ2) < R`,t(d∗s,t(I) + δ2)−R`,t(d∗s,t(I)) = Rs,t(d∗s,t(I) + δ2)−Rs,t(d∗s,t(I))
That is to say,
Rs,t(d
∗
s,t(I)) +R`,t(d
∗
`,t(I)) < R`,t(d
∗
`,t(I)− δ2) +Rs,t(d∗s,t(I) + δ2) (43)
Meanwhile, from the concavity of Vt+1 and δ2 < d
∗
`,t(I)− d∗s,t(I), we have:
EVt+1(I + qt − s,td∗s,t(I)− `,td∗`,t(I))
= (1− δ2
d∗`,t(I)− d∗s,t(I)
)EVt+1(I + qt − s,td∗s,t(I)− `,td∗`,t(I))
+
δ2
d∗`,t(I)− d∗s,t(I)
EVt+1(I + qt − s,td∗`,t(I)− `,td∗s,t(I))
≤ EVt+1(I + qt − s,t(d∗s,t(I) + δ2)− `,t(d∗`,t(I)− δ2)) (44)
Together with (42) and (43), we have
Jt(I, d
∗
s,t(I) + δ2, d
∗
`,t(I)− δ2)
= Rs,t(d
∗
s,t(I) + δ2) +R`,t(d
∗
`,t(I)− δ2)−E[H(I + qt − s,t(d∗s,t(I) + δ2))]
+αEVt+1(I + qt − s,t(d∗s,t(I) + δ2)− `,t(d∗`,t(I)− δ2))
> Rs,t(d
∗
s,t(I)) +R`,t(d
∗
`,t(I))−E[H(I + qt − s,td∗s,t(I))]
+αEVt+1(I + qt − s,td∗s,t(I)− `,td∗`,t(I))
= Jt(I, d
∗
s,t(I), d
∗
`,t(I))
and this also leads to a contradiction with the optimality of (d∗s,t(I), d∗`,t(I)).
c) To prove case c), we simply point to the continuity of d∗s,t(I), d∗`,t(I) and the results of cases a)
and b).

Proof of Proposition 1. When d∗s,t(I) > 0, we have for every realization ˜s,t
Vt(I)− Vt(I − ˜s,td∗s,t(I)) ≤ Vt(I)− Jt(I − ˜s,td∗s,t(I), 0, d∗`,t(I)) (45)
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Hence, we have
Vt(I)− Vt(I − d∗s,t(I)) ≤ Vt(I)−E˜s,t [Vt(I − ˜s,td∗s,t(I))]
≤ Vt(I)−E˜s,t [Jt(I − ˜s,td∗s,t(I), 0, d∗`,t(I))]
= Rs,t(d
∗
s,t(I)) +R`,t(d
∗
`,t(I))−EH(I + qt − s,td∗s,t(I))
+αEVt+1(I + qt − s,td∗s,t(I)− `,td∗`,t(I))−E˜s,tJt(I − ˜s,td∗s,t(I), 0, d∗`,t(I))
= Rs,t(d
∗
s,t(I))−Rs,t(0)
The second inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. The second inequality follows from ( 45).
V ′t (I) ≤
Vt(I)− Vt(I − d∗s,t(I))
d∗s,t(I)
≤ Rs,t(d
∗
s,t(I))−Rs,t(0)
d∗s,t(I)
< R′s,t(0).

Proof of Proposition 2. If I + qt ≤ 0, then from the first order partial derivatives we have:
Notice that
0 =
∂Jt(I, ds, d`)
∂ds
∣∣∣∣
ds=0
= R′s,t(0) + E
[
s,t(−cp)
]− αE[s,tV ′t+1(I + qt − `,td∗`,t(I))]
= R′s,t(0)−
{
cp + αE
[
s,tV
′
t+1(I + qt − `,td∗`,t(I))
]}.
V ′(I) =
∂Jt(I, ds, d`)
∂I
= cp + EV
′
t+1(I + qt − `,td∗`,t(I)).
Notice that if s,t and `,t are perfect positive correlated, then from the concavity of V (.) we have
EV ′t+1(I + qt − `,td∗`,t(I)) = E
[
s,t
]
EV ′t+1(I + qt − `,td∗`,t(I)) ≤ E
[
s,tV
′
t+1(I + qt − `,td∗`,t(I))
]
.
If s,t and `,t are perfect negative correlated, then from the concavity of V (.) we have
EV ′t+1(I + qt − `,td∗`,t(I)) = E
[
s,t
]
EV ′t+1(I + qt − `,td∗`,t(I)) ≥ E
[
s,tV
′
t+1(I + qt − `,td∗`,t(I))
]
.
Therefore R′s,t(0) − V ′(I) ≥ 0 if s,t and `,t perfect positive correlated and R′s,t(0) − V ′(I) ≤ 0 if
s,t and `,t perfect negative correlated
Follow the similar logic, we can obtain the statement is true when I + qt > 0. We conclude the
proof. 
Proof of Theorem 6. The result follows from Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. 
Proof of Lemma 6. From the concavity of Vt and the linear combination form of the demand
functions, we have Jut is submodular in (I, p). Hence, p
u
t (I) decreases in I 
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Proof of Theorem 7. To simplify the proof, we denote
G(I) = −βs,t[R′s,t(0) +H ′(I + qt)− V ′t+1(I + qt)]
−β`,t[R′`,t(0)− V ′t+1(I + qt)].
Notice that G(I) decreases in I.
Taking first order partial derivatives of Jut (I, p) with respect of p,
dJut
dp
∣∣∣∣
I=Iut ∗
= −βs,tR′s,t(0)− β`,tR′`,t(0)−E
[
εs,tβs,tH
′(I + qt)
]
+E
[
(εs,tβs,t + ε`,tβ`,t)V
′
t+1(I + qt)
]
= G(Iut ∗)
To compare I∗s,t, I∗`,t and I
u
t ∗, we discuss two cases: (i) I∗s,t ≥ I∗f,t; (ii) I∗s,t ≤ I∗f,t.
To see (i), we need to prove that I∗`,t ≤ Iut ∗ ≤ I∗s,t. According to first order partial derivatives of Jt
with respect to ds and dl.
0 = ∂Jtds
∣∣∣∣
I=I∗f,t
≤ R′s,t(0) +H ′(I + qt)− V ′t+1(I + qt), 0 = ∂Jtdl
∣∣∣∣
I=I∗f,t
≤ R′`,t(0)− V ′t+1(I + qt)
0 = ∂Jtds
∣∣∣∣
I=I∗s,t
= R′s,t(0) +H ′(I + qt)− V ′t+1(I + qt), 0 ≥ ∂Jtdl
∣∣∣∣
I=I∗s,t
= R′`,t(0)− V ′t+1(I + qt).
Hence, G(I∗`,t) ≥ 0 and G(I∗s,t) ≤ 0. From the decreasing proposition of G, we have I∗`,t ≤ Iut ∗ ≤ I∗s,t.
Following a similar argument, this result is also true for Case (ii) and we conclude the proof. 
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